Thursday, December 04, 2014
Tweet[IWS] World Bank: MOTIVATIONS, MONITORING TECHNOLOGIES, AND PAY FOR PERFORMANCE [December 2014]
IWS Documented News Service
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Institute for Workplace Studies----------------- Professor Samuel B. Bacharach
School of Industrial & Labor Relations-------- Director, Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell University
16 East 34th Street, 4th floor---------------------- Stuart Basefsky
New York, NY 10016 -------------------------------Director, IWS News Bureau
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World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper 7128
MOTIVATIONS, MONITORING TECHNOLOGIES, AND PAY FOR PERFORMANCE [December 2014]
by Cordella, Antonio; Cordella, Tito
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/20608
or
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/20608/WPS7128.pdf?sequence=1
[full-text, 26 pages]
Monitoring technologies and pay for
performance contracts are becoming popular solutions to
improve public services delivery. Their track record is
however mixed. To show why this may be the case, this paper
develops a principal agent model where agents'
motivations vary and so does the effectiveness of monitoring
technologies. In such a set-up the model shows that: (i)
monitoring technologies should be introduced only if
agents' motivations are poor; (ii) optimal pay for
performance contracts are nonlinear/non-monotonic in
agents' motivations and monitoring effectiveness; (iii)
investments aimed at improving agents' motivations and
monitoring quality are substitutes when agents are
motivated, complements otherwise; and (iv) if the
agents' "type" is private information, the
more and less motivated agents could be separated through a
menu of pay for performance/non pay for performance
contracts, such that only the less motivated choose the pay
for performance ones.
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