Thursday, December 04, 2014

Tweet

[IWS] World Bank: MOTIVATIONS, MONITORING TECHNOLOGIES, AND PAY FOR PERFORMANCE [December 2014]

IWS Documented News Service

_______________________________

Institute for Workplace Studies----------------- Professor Samuel B. Bacharach

School of Industrial & Labor Relations-------- Director, Institute for Workplace Studies

Cornell University

16 East 34th Street, 4th floor---------------------- Stuart Basefsky

New York, NY 10016 -------------------------------Director, IWS News Bureau

________________________________________________________________________

 

This service is supported, in part, by donations. Please consider making a donation by following the instructions at http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/iws/news-bureau/support.html

 

World Bank

Policy Research Working Paper 7128

 

MOTIVATIONS, MONITORING TECHNOLOGIES, AND PAY FOR PERFORMANCE [December 2014]

by Cordella, Antonio; Cordella, Tito

https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/20608

or

https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/20608/WPS7128.pdf?sequence=1

[full-text, 26 pages]

 

Monitoring technologies and pay for

performance contracts are becoming popular solutions to

improve public services delivery. Their track record is

however mixed. To show why this may be the case, this paper

develops a principal agent model where agents'

motivations vary and so does the effectiveness of monitoring

technologies. In such a set-up the model shows that: (i)

monitoring technologies should be introduced only if

agents' motivations are poor; (ii) optimal pay for

performance contracts are nonlinear/non-monotonic in

agents' motivations and monitoring effectiveness; (iii)

investments aimed at improving agents' motivations and

monitoring quality are substitutes when agents are

motivated, complements otherwise; and (iv) if the

agents' "type" is private information, the

more and less motivated agents could be separated through a

menu of pay for performance/non pay for performance

contracts, such that only the less motivated choose the pay

for performance ones.

________________________________________________________________________

This information is provided to subscribers, friends, faculty, students and alumni of the School of Industrial & Labor Relations (ILR). It is a service of the Institute for Workplace Studies (IWS) in New York City. Stuart Basefsky is responsible for the selection of the contents which is intended to keep researchers, companies, workers, and governments aware of the latest information related to ILR disciplines as it becomes available for the purposes of research, understanding and debate. The content does not reflect the opinions or positions of Cornell University, the School of Industrial & Labor Relations, or that of Mr. Basefsky and should not be construed as such. The service is unique in that it provides the original source documentation, via links, behind the news and research of the day. Use of the information provided is unrestricted. However, it is requested that users acknowledge that the information was found via the IWS Documented News Service.

 




Links to this post:

Create a Link



<< Home

This page is powered by Blogger. Isn't yours?