Monday, July 03, 2006
Tweet[IWS] CBO: The Effects of Liberalizing World Agricultural Trade: A Review of Modeling Studies [1 July 2006]
IWS Documented News Service
_______________________________
Institute for Workplace Studies----------------- Professor Samuel B. Bacharach
School of Industrial & Labor Relations-------- Director, Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell University
16 East 34th Street, 4th floor---------------------- Stuart Basefsky
New York, NY 10016 -------------------------------Director, IWS News Bureau
________________________________________________________________________
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (CBO)
A PAPER, JUNE 2006
The Effects of Liberalizing World Agricultural Trade: A Review of Modeling Studies
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/73xx/doc7352/06-30-Trade.pdf
[full-text, 128 pages]
[excerpt]
A major issue on the agenda of the ongoing Doha Round of multilateral negotiations
by members of the World Trade Organization concerns how and to what extent policies that
affect agricultural trade should be liberalized. For most of the postwar period, the series of
multilateral negotiating rounds under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade allowed policies that distort agricultural trade to continue in large part while tariffs and
other policies that distort trade in other sectors were progressively reduced or eliminated. The
Uruguay Round, which took place from 1986 through 1994, began the liberalization of agricultural
trade; yet tariffs remain much higher, and the use of subsidies remains much more
prevalent, in agriculture than in other goods-producing industries.
In August 2005, in response to a request by the Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) published a paper that presented statistics
on policies around the world that distort agricultural trade. In December 2005, in
response to the same request, CBO published a paper that surveyed the results of studies that
estimate the economic effects of liberalizing those policies. The December paper was brief,
focusing on the general conclusions that could be drawn from the studies and selected numerical
results to illuminate them. This paper gives a more complete presentation of the numerical
results as well as additional explanation concerning their interpretation. In keeping with
CBO's mandate to provide objective, nonpartisan analysis, the paper makes no recommendations.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
A Qualitative Discussion of the Effects of Liberalization 2
Some Important Modeling Concepts and Qualifications 4
2 Economywide Effects of Full Liberalization 9
The Total Worldwide Cost of Policies That Distort Agricultural Trade 9
Comparison with the Cost of Trade-Distorting Policies in Other Goods Sectors 17
Gains and Losses to Individual Countries from Liberalization 17
Breakdown of Costs by Type of Policy 20
3 Considerations Concerning Partial Liberalization 51
The Need for Large Reductions in Tariff and Subsidy Bindings 51
Allowance for Sensitive and Special Products 55
The Effects of Liberalizing Other Goods Sectors 57
The Effects of Special and Differential Treatment 58
Tariff-Rate Quotas: Quota Expansion Versus Tariff Reduction 58
4 Other Effects of Agricultural Liberalization 75
Effects on Countries' Agricultural Sectors 75
Effects on Factor Returns 77
Countries Whose Liberalization Would Most Help Developing Countries 79
Product-Specific Effects on U.S. Agriculture 80
Bibliography 115
Includes NUMEROUS TABLES.....
______________________________
This information is provided to subscribers, friends, faculty, students and alumni of the School of Industrial & Labor Relations (ILR). It is a service of the Institute for Workplace Studies (IWS) in New York City. Stuart Basefsky is responsible for the selection of the contents which is intended to keep researchers, companies, workers, and governments aware of the latest information related to ILR disciplines as it becomes available for the purposes of research, understanding and debate. The content does not reflect the opinions or positions of Cornell University, the School of Industrial & Labor Relations, or that of Mr. Basefsky and should not be construed as such. The service is unique in that it provides the original source documentation, via links, behind the news and research of the day. Use of the information provided is unrestricted. However, it is requested that users acknowledge that the information was found via the IWS Documented News Service.
****************************************
Stuart Basefsky
Director, IWS News Bureau
Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell/ILR School
16 E. 34th Street, 4th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Telephone: (607) 255-2703
Fax: (607) 255-9641
E-mail: smb6@cornell.edu
****************************************
_______________________________
Institute for Workplace Studies----------------- Professor Samuel B. Bacharach
School of Industrial & Labor Relations-------- Director, Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell University
16 East 34th Street, 4th floor---------------------- Stuart Basefsky
New York, NY 10016 -------------------------------Director, IWS News Bureau
________________________________________________________________________
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (CBO)
A PAPER, JUNE 2006
The Effects of Liberalizing World Agricultural Trade: A Review of Modeling Studies
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/73xx/doc7352/06-30-Trade.pdf
[full-text, 128 pages]
[excerpt]
A major issue on the agenda of the ongoing Doha Round of multilateral negotiations
by members of the World Trade Organization concerns how and to what extent policies that
affect agricultural trade should be liberalized. For most of the postwar period, the series of
multilateral negotiating rounds under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade allowed policies that distort agricultural trade to continue in large part while tariffs and
other policies that distort trade in other sectors were progressively reduced or eliminated. The
Uruguay Round, which took place from 1986 through 1994, began the liberalization of agricultural
trade; yet tariffs remain much higher, and the use of subsidies remains much more
prevalent, in agriculture than in other goods-producing industries.
In August 2005, in response to a request by the Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) published a paper that presented statistics
on policies around the world that distort agricultural trade. In December 2005, in
response to the same request, CBO published a paper that surveyed the results of studies that
estimate the economic effects of liberalizing those policies. The December paper was brief,
focusing on the general conclusions that could be drawn from the studies and selected numerical
results to illuminate them. This paper gives a more complete presentation of the numerical
results as well as additional explanation concerning their interpretation. In keeping with
CBO's mandate to provide objective, nonpartisan analysis, the paper makes no recommendations.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
A Qualitative Discussion of the Effects of Liberalization 2
Some Important Modeling Concepts and Qualifications 4
2 Economywide Effects of Full Liberalization 9
The Total Worldwide Cost of Policies That Distort Agricultural Trade 9
Comparison with the Cost of Trade-Distorting Policies in Other Goods Sectors 17
Gains and Losses to Individual Countries from Liberalization 17
Breakdown of Costs by Type of Policy 20
3 Considerations Concerning Partial Liberalization 51
The Need for Large Reductions in Tariff and Subsidy Bindings 51
Allowance for Sensitive and Special Products 55
The Effects of Liberalizing Other Goods Sectors 57
The Effects of Special and Differential Treatment 58
Tariff-Rate Quotas: Quota Expansion Versus Tariff Reduction 58
4 Other Effects of Agricultural Liberalization 75
Effects on Countries' Agricultural Sectors 75
Effects on Factor Returns 77
Countries Whose Liberalization Would Most Help Developing Countries 79
Product-Specific Effects on U.S. Agriculture 80
Bibliography 115
Includes NUMEROUS TABLES.....
______________________________
This information is provided to subscribers, friends, faculty, students and alumni of the School of Industrial & Labor Relations (ILR). It is a service of the Institute for Workplace Studies (IWS) in New York City. Stuart Basefsky is responsible for the selection of the contents which is intended to keep researchers, companies, workers, and governments aware of the latest information related to ILR disciplines as it becomes available for the purposes of research, understanding and debate. The content does not reflect the opinions or positions of Cornell University, the School of Industrial & Labor Relations, or that of Mr. Basefsky and should not be construed as such. The service is unique in that it provides the original source documentation, via links, behind the news and research of the day. Use of the information provided is unrestricted. However, it is requested that users acknowledge that the information was found via the IWS Documented News Service.
Stuart Basefsky
Director, IWS News Bureau
Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell/ILR School
16 E. 34th Street, 4th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Telephone: (607) 255-2703
Fax: (607) 255-9641
E-mail: smb6@cornell.edu
****************************************