Tuesday, May 30, 2006
Tweet[IWS] IILS: IRELAND, ITALY, & S. KOREA SOCIAL PACTS--COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS [online May 2006]
IWS Documented News Service
_______________________________
Institute for Workplace Studies----------------- Professor Samuel B. Bacharach
School of Industrial & Labor Relations-------- Director, Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell University
16 East 34th Street, 4th floor---------------------- Stuart Basefsky
New York, NY 10016 -------------------------------Director, IWS News Bureau
________________________________________________________________________
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR LABOUR STUDIES (IILS) [at the ILO]
Discussion paper DP/162/2006
Decent Work Research Programme
Social pacts as coalitions of weak and moderate: Ireland, Italy and South Korea in comparative perspective
Lucio Baccaro and Sang-Hoon Lim
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/dp16206.pdf
[full-text, 40 pages]
Abstract:
Based on an analysis of the Irish, Italian and South Korean cases, this paper argues that
a social pact is a coalition of weak and moderate, namely the result of a strategic alliance
between an electoral weak government faced with a political economic crisis and the most
moderate sections of the labour movement. We relax the assumption, upheld by most literature,
of unions as unitary actors and argue that such strategic commitment only emerges as the result
of an internal political battle inside the unions, when the moderates prevail over the radicals and
shape the strategic stance of the labour movement as a whole. As illustrated by the Italian and
Irish cases, decision-making rules bringing the preferences of the rank-and-file (and even nonunion
workers) to bear on the process of collective decision help the moderate faction to prevail.
In contrast, when the process of collective choice is limited to middle-level leaders, the radicals
are more likely to gain the upper hand, as suggested by the Korean case. The paper also argues
that the employers strategic commitment is not strictly necessary for a social pact to emerge, but
becomes key for its reproduction and stabilization over time. Indeed, the difference in resilience
and duration between the Irish and Italian social pacts can be explained by the divergent longterm
strategic choices of organized employers. We check the robustness of this explanatory
framework by examining briefly a number of counterfactual cases.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Introduction....................................................................................................................... 1
2. Why and how do social pacts emerge?............................................................................... 3
a) Economic crisis ........................................................................................................... 4
b) Weak government........................................................................................................5
c) The struggle between radicals and moderates in the union movement. ...................... 7
i) Korea ... . .. ....7
ii) Italy. . .. 8
iii) Ireland . . ... . 10
d) The role of employers . .11
3. Explaining social pacts: an analytical framework ... 13
4. Concluding remarks .16
References ..19
______________________________
This information is provided to subscribers, friends, faculty, students and alumni of the School of Industrial & Labor Relations (ILR). It is a service of the Institute for Workplace Studies (IWS) in New York City. Stuart Basefsky is responsible for the selection of the contents which is intended to keep researchers, companies, workers, and governments aware of the latest information related to ILR disciplines as it becomes available for the purposes of research, understanding and debate. The content does not reflect the opinions or positions of Cornell University, the School of Industrial & Labor Relations, or that of Mr. Basefsky and should not be construed as such. The service is unique in that it provides the original source documentation, via links, behind the news and research of the day. Use of the information provided is unrestricted. However, it is requested that users acknowledge that the information was found via the IWS Documented News Service.
Stuart Basefsky
Director, IWS News Bureau
Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell/ILR School
16 E. 34th Street, 4th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Telephone: (607) 255-2703
Fax: (607) 255-9641
E-mail: smb6@cornell.edu
****************************************
_______________________________
Institute for Workplace Studies----------------- Professor Samuel B. Bacharach
School of Industrial & Labor Relations-------- Director, Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell University
16 East 34th Street, 4th floor---------------------- Stuart Basefsky
New York, NY 10016 -------------------------------Director, IWS News Bureau
________________________________________________________________________
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR LABOUR STUDIES (IILS) [at the ILO]
Discussion paper DP/162/2006
Decent Work Research Programme
Social pacts as coalitions of weak and moderate: Ireland, Italy and South Korea in comparative perspective
Lucio Baccaro and Sang-Hoon Lim
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/dp16206.pdf
[full-text, 40 pages]
Abstract:
Based on an analysis of the Irish, Italian and South Korean cases, this paper argues that
a social pact is a coalition of weak and moderate, namely the result of a strategic alliance
between an electoral weak government faced with a political economic crisis and the most
moderate sections of the labour movement. We relax the assumption, upheld by most literature,
of unions as unitary actors and argue that such strategic commitment only emerges as the result
of an internal political battle inside the unions, when the moderates prevail over the radicals and
shape the strategic stance of the labour movement as a whole. As illustrated by the Italian and
Irish cases, decision-making rules bringing the preferences of the rank-and-file (and even nonunion
workers) to bear on the process of collective decision help the moderate faction to prevail.
In contrast, when the process of collective choice is limited to middle-level leaders, the radicals
are more likely to gain the upper hand, as suggested by the Korean case. The paper also argues
that the employers strategic commitment is not strictly necessary for a social pact to emerge, but
becomes key for its reproduction and stabilization over time. Indeed, the difference in resilience
and duration between the Irish and Italian social pacts can be explained by the divergent longterm
strategic choices of organized employers. We check the robustness of this explanatory
framework by examining briefly a number of counterfactual cases.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Introduction....................................................................................................................... 1
2. Why and how do social pacts emerge?............................................................................... 3
a) Economic crisis ........................................................................................................... 4
b) Weak government........................................................................................................5
c) The struggle between radicals and moderates in the union movement. ...................... 7
i) Korea ... . .. ....7
ii) Italy. . .. 8
iii) Ireland . . ... . 10
d) The role of employers . .11
3. Explaining social pacts: an analytical framework ... 13
4. Concluding remarks .16
References ..19
______________________________
This information is provided to subscribers, friends, faculty, students and alumni of the School of Industrial & Labor Relations (ILR). It is a service of the Institute for Workplace Studies (IWS) in New York City. Stuart Basefsky is responsible for the selection of the contents which is intended to keep researchers, companies, workers, and governments aware of the latest information related to ILR disciplines as it becomes available for the purposes of research, understanding and debate. The content does not reflect the opinions or positions of Cornell University, the School of Industrial & Labor Relations, or that of Mr. Basefsky and should not be construed as such. The service is unique in that it provides the original source documentation, via links, behind the news and research of the day. Use of the information provided is unrestricted. However, it is requested that users acknowledge that the information was found via the IWS Documented News Service.
Stuart Basefsky
Director, IWS News Bureau
Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell/ILR School
16 E. 34th Street, 4th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Telephone: (607) 255-2703
Fax: (607) 255-9641
E-mail: smb6@cornell.edu
****************************************
# posted by SBasefsky : 8:58 AM
