Friday, November 04, 2005
Tweet[IWS] NBER: Turning Workers into Savers? Incentives, Liquidity, and Choice in 401(k) Plan Design [October 2005]
IWS Documented News Service
_______________________________
Institute for Workplace Studies Professor Samuel B. Bacharach
School of Industrial & Labor Relations Director, Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell University
16 East 34th Street, 4th floor Stuart Basefsky
New York, NY 10016 Director, IWS News Bureau
________________________________________________________________________
Turning Workers into Savers? Incentives, Liquidity, and Choice in 401(k) Plan Design
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11726.pdf
[full-text, 34 pages]
Olivia S. Mitchell, Stephen P. Utkus, Tongxuan (Stella) Yang
NBER Working Paper No. 11726
Issued in October 2005
---- Abstract -----
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11726
We develop a comprehensive model of 401(k) pension design that reflects the complex tax, savings, liquidity and investment incentives of such plans. Using a new dataset on some 500 plans covering nearly 740,000 workers, we show that employer matching contributions have only a modest impact on eliciting additional retirement saving. In the typical 401(k) plan, only 10 percent of non-highly-compensated workers are induced to save more by match incentives; and 30 percent fail to join their plan at all, despite the fact that the company-proffered match would grant them a real return premium of 1-5% above market rates if they contributed. Such indifference to retirement saving incentives cannot be attributed to liquidity or investment constraints. These results underscore the need for alternative approaches beyond matching contributions, if retirement saving is to become broader-based.
_____________________________
This information is provided to subscribers, friends, faculty, students and alumni of the School of Industrial & Labor Relations (ILR). It is a service of the Institute for Workplace Studies (IWS) in New York City. Stuart Basefsky is responsible for the selection of the contents which is intended to keep researchers, companies, workers, and governments aware of the latest information related to ILR disciplines as it becomes available for the purposes of research, understanding and debate. The content does not reflect the opinions or positions of Cornell University, the School of Industrial & Labor Relations, or that of Mr. Basefsky and should not be construed as such. The service is unique in that it provides the original source documentation, via links, behind the news and research of the day. Use of the information provided is unrestricted. However, it is requested that users acknowledge that the information was found via the IWS Documented News Service.
Stuart Basefsky *
Director, IWS News Bureau *
Institute for Workplace Studies *
Cornell/ILR School *
16 E. 34th Street, 4th Floor *
New York, NY 10016 *
*
Telephone: (607) 255-2703 *
Fax: (607) 255-9641 *
E-mail: smb6@cornell.edu *
****************************************
_______________________________
Institute for Workplace Studies
School of Industrial & Labor Relations
Cornell University
16 East 34th Street, 4th floor
New York, NY 10016
________________________________________________________________________
Turning Workers into Savers? Incentives, Liquidity, and Choice in 401(k) Plan Design
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11726.pdf
[full-text, 34 pages]
Olivia S. Mitchell, Stephen P. Utkus, Tongxuan (Stella) Yang
NBER Working Paper No. 11726
Issued in October 2005
---- Abstract -----
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11726
We develop a comprehensive model of 401(k) pension design that reflects the complex tax, savings, liquidity and investment incentives of such plans. Using a new dataset on some 500 plans covering nearly 740,000 workers, we show that employer matching contributions have only a modest impact on eliciting additional retirement saving. In the typical 401(k) plan, only 10 percent of non-highly-compensated workers are induced to save more by match incentives; and 30 percent fail to join their plan at all, despite the fact that the company-proffered match would grant them a real return premium of 1-5% above market rates if they contributed. Such indifference to retirement saving incentives cannot be attributed to liquidity or investment constraints. These results underscore the need for alternative approaches beyond matching contributions, if retirement saving is to become broader-based.
_____________________________
This information is provided to subscribers, friends, faculty, students and alumni of the School of Industrial & Labor Relations (ILR). It is a service of the Institute for Workplace Studies (IWS) in New York City. Stuart Basefsky is responsible for the selection of the contents which is intended to keep researchers, companies, workers, and governments aware of the latest information related to ILR disciplines as it becomes available for the purposes of research, understanding and debate. The content does not reflect the opinions or positions of Cornell University, the School of Industrial & Labor Relations, or that of Mr. Basefsky and should not be construed as such. The service is unique in that it provides the original source documentation, via links, behind the news and research of the day. Use of the information provided is unrestricted. However, it is requested that users acknowledge that the information was found via the IWS Documented News Service.
Stuart Basefsky
Director, IWS News Bureau
Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell/ILR School
16 E. 34th Street, 4th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Telephone: (607) 255-2703
Fax: (607) 255-9641
E-mail: smb6@cornell.edu
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# posted by SBasefsky : 4:06 PM
