Tuesday, September 27, 2005
Tweet[IWS] IADB: MEXICO: Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes & Policy Outcomes [September 2005]
IWS Documented News Service
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Institute for Workplace Studies Professor Samuel B. Bacharach
School of Industrial & Labor Relations Director, Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell University
16 East 34th Street, 4th floor Stuart Basefsky
New York, NY 10016 Director, IWS News Bureau
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Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes, and Policy Outcomes in Mexico
http://www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubR-512.pdf
[full-text, 68 pages]
R-512
Author: Lehoucq, Fabrice
Negretto, Gabriel
Aparicio, Francisco
Nacif, Benito
Benton, Allyson
Published: September 2005
Language: English
Abstract:
This paper uses a transaction-costs framework to link the policymaking process (PMP) and the outer features of public policies in Mexico, a middle-income developing country. It shows how a highly secretive PMP, centralized around the presidency, fashioned nationalist policies that were stable, adaptable, coordinated and private-regarding for the urban-based corporatist pillars of the regime. When growth faltered in the late 1970s, however, this PMP was unable to adapt to economic volatility, although it remained dominant in an increasingly turbulent polity. The paper explains how unified government and corporatist control of the economy made a constitutionally weak president the envy of executives around the world, even at the cost of being unable to enact reforms with short-term costs for the corporatist pillars of the regime. The article also explains why democratization in the 1990s is giving rise to a less centralized and more open PMP that benefits larger shares of the population. As the separation of powers enshrined in the 1917 constitution materializes, policymaking is increasingly wedded to the status quo. On the one hand, divided government preserves a macroeconomic framework consistent with an open economy (such as fiscally sound policies and a floating exchange rate). On the other, checks and balances are helping old and new parties and interest groups to veto agreement on the raising of chronically low tax rates (at 10 percent of GDP) and on reforming nationalist policies that limit private sector investment in the state-controlled energy sector.
_____________________________
This information is provided to subscribers, friends, faculty, students and alumni of the School of Industrial & Labor Relations (ILR). It is a service of the Institute for Workplace Studies (IWS) in New York City. Stuart Basefsky is responsible for the selection of the contents which is intended to keep researchers, companies, workers, and governments aware of the latest information related to ILR disciplines as it becomes available for the purposes of research, understanding and debate. The content does not reflect the opinions or positions of Cornell University, the School of Industrial & Labor Relations, or that of Mr. Basefsky and should not be construed as such. The service is unique in that it provides the original source documentation, via links, behind the news and research of the day. Use of the information provided is unrestricted. However, it is requested that users acknowledge that the information was found via the IWS Documented News Service.
Stuart Basefsky *
Director, IWS News Bureau *
Institute for Workplace Studies *
Cornell/ILR School *
16 E. 34th Street, 4th Floor *
New York, NY 10016 *
*
Telephone: (607) 255-2703 *
Fax: (607) 255-9641 *
E-mail: smb6@cornell.edu *
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_______________________________
Institute for Workplace Studies
School of Industrial & Labor Relations
Cornell University
16 East 34th Street, 4th floor
New York, NY 10016
________________________________________________________________________
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes, and Policy Outcomes in Mexico
http://www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubR-512.pdf
[full-text, 68 pages]
R-512
Author: Lehoucq, Fabrice
Negretto, Gabriel
Aparicio, Francisco
Nacif, Benito
Benton, Allyson
Published: September 2005
Language: English
Abstract:
This paper uses a transaction-costs framework to link the policymaking process (PMP) and the outer features of public policies in Mexico, a middle-income developing country. It shows how a highly secretive PMP, centralized around the presidency, fashioned nationalist policies that were stable, adaptable, coordinated and private-regarding for the urban-based corporatist pillars of the regime. When growth faltered in the late 1970s, however, this PMP was unable to adapt to economic volatility, although it remained dominant in an increasingly turbulent polity. The paper explains how unified government and corporatist control of the economy made a constitutionally weak president the envy of executives around the world, even at the cost of being unable to enact reforms with short-term costs for the corporatist pillars of the regime. The article also explains why democratization in the 1990s is giving rise to a less centralized and more open PMP that benefits larger shares of the population. As the separation of powers enshrined in the 1917 constitution materializes, policymaking is increasingly wedded to the status quo. On the one hand, divided government preserves a macroeconomic framework consistent with an open economy (such as fiscally sound policies and a floating exchange rate). On the other, checks and balances are helping old and new parties and interest groups to veto agreement on the raising of chronically low tax rates (at 10 percent of GDP) and on reforming nationalist policies that limit private sector investment in the state-controlled energy sector.
_____________________________
This information is provided to subscribers, friends, faculty, students and alumni of the School of Industrial & Labor Relations (ILR). It is a service of the Institute for Workplace Studies (IWS) in New York City. Stuart Basefsky is responsible for the selection of the contents which is intended to keep researchers, companies, workers, and governments aware of the latest information related to ILR disciplines as it becomes available for the purposes of research, understanding and debate. The content does not reflect the opinions or positions of Cornell University, the School of Industrial & Labor Relations, or that of Mr. Basefsky and should not be construed as such. The service is unique in that it provides the original source documentation, via links, behind the news and research of the day. Use of the information provided is unrestricted. However, it is requested that users acknowledge that the information was found via the IWS Documented News Service.
Stuart Basefsky
Director, IWS News Bureau
Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell/ILR School
16 E. 34th Street, 4th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Telephone: (607) 255-2703
Fax: (607) 255-9641
E-mail: smb6@cornell.edu
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# posted by SBasefsky : 12:15 PM
