Tuesday, September 23, 2014
Tweet[IWS] CRS: THE EFFECT OF FIRM BANKRUPTCY ON RETIREE BENEFITS, WITH APPLICATIONS TO THE AUTOMOTIVE AND COAL INDUSTRIES [22 September 2014]
IWS Documented News Service
_______________________________
Institute for Workplace Studies----------------- Professor Samuel B. Bacharach
School of Industrial & Labor Relations-------- Director, Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell University
16 East 34th Street, 4th floor---------------------- Stuart Basefsky
New York, NY 10016 -------------------------------Director, IWS News Bureau
________________________________________________________________________
This service is supported, in part, by donations. Please consider making a donation by following the instructions at http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/iws/news-bureau/support.html
Congressional Research Service (CRS)
The Effect of Firm Bankruptcy on Retiree Benefits, with Applications to the Automotive and Coal Industries
Carol Rapaport, Analyst in Health Care Financing
September 22, 2014
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43732.pdf
[full-text, 28 pages]
Summary
Benefits for retired employees are of particular interest to policy makers because of the growing
number of retirees and forecasts indicating that some future retirees may not have the necessary
financial resources to maintain their standards of living. Part of this congressional concern is what
happens when bankrupt employers are unable to provide promised pension and health benefits to
their retired employees.
In chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization, the employer receives protections against its financial
commitments in the hope that it may once again become profitable. This protection could include
not having to honor obligations concerning pensions and retiree health insurance. Its employees
may therefore be at risk of not receiving some of their promised benefits. Unionized and nonunionized
employees may be treated differently under the law because unionized workers have a
legal contract governing their terms and conditions of employment.
The costs to the employers for the pension, health insurance, and other benefits promised to
retired employees are known as legacy costs, and different costs are subject to different federal
laws. Although employers are required to prefund their defined benefit pension trusts, the level of
required funding may not be present as the employer enters bankruptcy. The Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a quasi-public agency, monitors the finances of pension plans.
The PBGC becomes the trustee of and pays the benefits to participants in terminated,
underfunded single-employer pension plans. PBGC benefits are subject to a statutory maximum
that may be less than the retiree was promised by his or her employer. The PBGC has been
running deficits for several years, and the deficit for one of its two programs is at an all-time
record high. PBGC funding comes from employer premiums set by Congress, the assets of the
plans it takes over, and investment returns. There is no taxpayer funding.
Some retirees receive health benefits from their former employer. Retiree health benefits,
however, are not insured by any public agency, and employers are not required to prefund health
benefits. On the other hand, employees (perhaps represented by their unions) can fund health
benefits (for active and retired employees) through a tax-preferred trust fund known as a
Voluntary Employees’ Beneficiary Association (VEBA). When the employer and union agree to
form a VEBA, and it is approved by the bankruptcy court, the employer generally contributes a
collectively bargained level of funding to the VEBA. Providing the contribution usually fulfills
the employer’s total responsibility for retiree health care. All subsequent retiree health benefit
decisions are transferred to the trustees of the VEBA.
After a discussion of these issues, this report provides three examples of bankruptcy proceedings
where the retirees’ pensions and health insurance benefits received substantial federal attention:
the General Motors Corporation, the Delphi Corporation, and the Patriot Coal Corporation.
During bankruptcy proceedings for the General Motors Corporation (commonly known as Old
GM or pre-bankruptcy GM) bankruptcy, retiree health benefits were central and pensions,
although underfunded, were not a major issue. Old GM’s main union, the United Auto Workers
(UAW), accepted stock in the General Motors Company (commonly known as New GM or postbankruptcy
GM) as a partial funding source for its retiree health care VEBA. The VEBA has
covered retiree health benefits since 2010. It was intended to cover retiree health benefits for 80
years, but it is unclear how long its funding will last.
Pensions were a central source of controversy during the bankruptcy of the Delphi Corporation
(Delphi). Some (union and nonunion) employees had been promised a pension greater than the
PBGC maximum. When the various Delphi pension plans were terminated by the PBGC, most
unionized employees did not see their pensions fall because of supplemental pension coverage
originally negotiated by Old GM and the UAW. The salaried Delphi workers, however, had no
union, and some found themselves receiving lower pension benefits than had been promised by
Delphi. Salaried workers formed a labor association, the Delphi Salaried Retirees Association
(DSRA), with hopes of strengthening their position. The DSRA has been unsuccessful in its
efforts to have their members’ pensions increased, and the subsequent court case has not yet been
settled.
The bankruptcy of the Patriot Coal Corporation (Patriot) was also complicated and contentious,
even though federal law covering retired coal miners has been in place for many years. Both
pension and retiree health benefits were central to the negotiations. The relevant union, the United
Mine Workers of America (UMWA), is a multiemployer union where the collectively bargained
contracts cover the employees of many employers. The UMWA Pension Trust was underfunded
before the Patriot bankruptcy, and remains underfunded. In fact, some consider the potential
insolvency of the coal employers’ pension plan a threat to the overall solvency of PBGC’s
program on multiemployer pension plans. Because many Patriot retirees were employees of
another employer, Peabody Energy, when they were actively working, the bankruptcy court ruled
that Peabody, and not Patriot, was responsible for funding the VEBA newly created to cover
health benefits.
Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Protections for Retirees: Background Factors ................................................................................. 2
Bankruptcy ................................................................................................................................ 2
Type of Labor Organization....................................................................................................... 4
Type of Employee ...................................................................................................................... 5
Employer Agreements with its Former Subsidiaries ................................................................. 6
Protections for Retirees’ Pensions: The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ............................. 6
Background................................................................................................................................ 6
Single-Employer Plans .............................................................................................................. 8
Multiemployer Plans ................................................................................................................. 8
Protections for Retirees’ Health Insurance: VEBAs ...................................................................... 10
Advantages Associated with VEBAs....................................................................................... 11
Risks Associated with VEBAs ................................................................................................ 11
Funding VEBAs ...................................................................................................................... 11
Protections for Retirees: Other Programs ...................................................................................... 12
Case Study 1: General Motors and the United Auto Workers ........................................................ 14
Background.............................................................................................................................. 14
Pensions ................................................................................................................................... 14
Retiree Health Insurance ......................................................................................................... 15
Case Study 2: Delphi and the Delphi Salaried Retirees Association ............................................. 17
Background.............................................................................................................................. 17
Pensions ................................................................................................................................... 18
Retiree Health Insurance ......................................................................................................... 19
Case Study 3: Patriot Coal and the United Mine Workers of America .......................................... 20
Background.............................................................................................................................. 20
Pensions ................................................................................................................................... 21
Retiree Health Insurance ......................................................................................................... 22
Recent Legislation ................................................................................................................... 23
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 24
________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided to subscribers, friends, faculty, students and alumni of the School of Industrial & Labor Relations (ILR). It is a service of the Institute for Workplace Studies (IWS) in New York City. Stuart Basefsky is responsible for the selection of the contents which is intended to keep researchers, companies, workers, and governments aware of the latest information related to ILR disciplines as it becomes available for the purposes of research, understanding and debate. The content does not reflect the opinions or positions of Cornell University, the School of Industrial & Labor Relations, or that of Mr. Basefsky and should not be construed as such. The service is unique in that it provides the original source documentation, via links, behind the news and research of the day. Use of the information provided is unrestricted. However, it is requested that users acknowledge that the information was found via the IWS Documented News Service.