Monday, February 24, 2014
Tweet[IWS] CRS: COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES [19 February 2014]
IWS Documented News Service
_______________________________
Institute for Workplace Studies----------------- Professor Samuel B. Bacharach
School of Industrial & Labor Relations-------- Director, Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell University
16 East 34th Street, 4th floor---------------------- Stuart Basefsky
New York, NY 10016 -------------------------------Director, IWS News Bureau
________________________________________________________________________
Congressional Research Service (CRS)
Countering Violent Extremism in the United States
Jerome P. Bjelopera, Specialist in Organized Crime and Terrorism
February 19, 2014
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42553.pdf
[full-text, 33 pages]
Summary
In August 2011, the Obama Administration announced its counter-radicalization strategy. It is
devised to address the forces that influence some people living in the United States to acquire and
hold radical or extremist beliefs that may eventually compel them to commit terrorism. This is the
first such strategy for the federal government, which calls this effort “combating violent
extremism” (CVE). Since the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has
prosecuted hundreds of individuals on terrorism charges. Unlike the necessarily secretive law
enforcement and intelligence efforts driving these investigations, the CVE strategy includes
sizeable government activity within the open marketplace of ideas, where private citizens are free
to weigh competing ideologies and engage in constitutionally protected speech and expression.
Some of the key challenges in the implementation of the CVE strategy likely spring from the
interplay between the marketplace of ideas and the secretive realm encompassing law
enforcement investigations and terrorist plotting.
The strategy addresses the radicalization of all types of potential terrorists in the United States but
focuses on those inspired by Al Qaeda. To further elaborate this strategy, in December 2011 the
Administration released its “Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to
Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States” (SIP). The SIP is a large-scale planning
document with three major objectives and numerous future activities and efforts. The SIP’s three
objectives involve (1) enhancing federal community engagement efforts related to CVE, (2)
developing greater government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism,
and (3) countering violent extremist propaganda.
This report provides examples of Administration CVE activity and examines some of the risks
and challenges evident in the SIP’s three objectives. The report also diagrams and briefly
discusses the “future activities and efforts” outlined in the SIP for each of these three objectives.
A number of areas may call for oversight from Congress. These include the following:
Picking Partners and Establishing “Rules of the Road”
Much of the federal government’s CVE effort centers on engagement with Muslim American
community groups. This may not be as easy as simply reaching out to local organizations. Who
speaks for diverse Muslim communities in America? What criteria will the Administration
employ in its selection efforts, and how open will the process be? Once approved as partners,
what “rules of the road” will govern continued cooperation? Ad hoc and opaque decision making
might render the whole CVE outreach process arbitrary to some community participants.
Congress may opt to consider whether there is a need to require the Administration to release
public guidelines in this area.
Intervention with At-Risk Individuals
There appears to be little federally driven guidance to community groups on how to intervene
with people vulnerable to radicalization. Congress may desire to require the Administration to
examine the utility and feasibility of developing a CVE intervention model—possibly akin to
gang intervention models—for the United States.
Identifying Programs to Assist Grassroots CVE Efforts
Working with communities entails informing them of possible resources they can use. A publicly
available, comprehensive list of grant programs that can be harnessed for CVE activities does not
exist. Congress may be interested in asking the Administration to formalize a roster or designate a
clearinghouse available to local entities to identify such programs. By possibly pursuing this,
Congress may help to ensure that local constituents have better information about and more direct
access to federal CVE programs. On the other hand, such a list could be perceived as an
additional layer of bureaucracy between constituents and grant programs.
Countering Extremist Ideas: Choosing Good vs. Bad
The task of countering extremist ideas highlighted in the CVE strategy and SIP raises a number of
questions. Do the strategy and the SIP place the federal government in the business of
determining which ideologies are dangerous and which are safe—essentially determining which
beliefs are good and which are bad? In order to conduct effective oversight, Congress may choose
to ask the Administration to define exactly what it means when referring to “violent extremist
narratives.”
The Lack of a Lead Agency
There is no single agency managing all of the individual activities and efforts of the plan. At the
national level, some may argue that it would be of value to have a single federal agency in charge
of the government’s CVE efforts. From their perspective, without a lead agency it may be
difficult to monitor the levels of federal funding devoted to CVE efforts and how many personnel
are devoted to CVE in the federal government. For how many of these employees is counterradicalization
a full-time job? Are there mechanisms to track federal CVE expenditure? Which
federal body is responsible for this? Congress may wish to pursue with the Administration the
feasibility or value of designating a lead agency, or the possibility of naming a lead via
legislation. However, it is unclear what types of authority—especially in the budgetary realm—
such a lead may be able to wield over well-established agencies playing central roles in the CVE
strategy.
Transparency
Without a high degree of transparency, an engagement strategy driven by federal agencies
charged with intelligence gathering and law enforcement responsibilities may run the risk of
being perceived as an effort to co-opt communities into the security process—providing tips,
leads, sources, and informants. Some may maintain that this threatens to “securitize” a
relationship intended as outreach within the marketplace of ideas. As such, critics may argue that
it might not be particularly effective to have the same federal agencies responsible for classified
counterterrorism investigations grounded in secrecy also be the main players in the CVE strategy.
However, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation have responsibilities for much of the CVE program. Because of this
reality, Congress may opt to consider whether there is a need for greater transparency from the
Administration in its CVE efforts.
Contents
Introduction: Counterterrorism Context .......................................................................................... 1
From Radicalization to Terrorism .............................................................................................. 3
Countering Radicalization in the United States ............................................................................... 4
Administration Strategy and Current Activities ........................................................................ 4
Community Engagement ..................................................................................................... 5
Risks and Challenges .......................................................................................................... 9
Building Government and Law Enforcement Expertise ................................................... 14
Risks and Challenges ........................................................................................................ 17
Countering Violent Extremist Propaganda ........................................................................ 18
Risks and Challenges ........................................................................................................ 19
Administration Plan and Future Activities .............................................................................. 19
Is DHS the De Facto U.S. CVE Lead Agency? ................................................................. 20
Possible Policy Considerations for Congress .................................................................... 24
Implementing the CVE Strategy .............................................................................................. 24
Picking Partners and Establishing “Rules of the Road” .................................................... 24
Intervention with At-Risk Individuals ............................................................................... 25
Identifying Programs and Federal Contacts to Assist Grassroots CVE Efforts ................ 26
Countering Extremist Ideas: Choosing Good vs. Bad ....................................................... 26
The Lack of a Lead Agency .............................................................................................. 27
Secretiveness vs. Transparency ......................................................................................... 28
Figures
Figure 1. Counterterrorism Context ................................................................................................. 2
Figure 2. Lead Agencies and Their “Future Activities and Efforts” for SIP Objective 1, Enhancing Federal Engagement and Support to Local Communities that may be Targeted by Violent Extremists ........ 21
Figure 3. Lead Agencies and Their “Future Activities and Efforts” for SIP Objective 2, Building Government and Law Enforcement Expertise for Preventing Violent Extremism .............. 22
Figure 4. Lead Agencies and Their “Future Activities and Efforts” for SIP Objective 3, Countering Violent Extremist Propaganda While Promoting U.S. Ideals ........... 23
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 29
________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided to subscribers, friends, faculty, students and alumni of the School of Industrial & Labor Relations (ILR). It is a service of the Institute for Workplace Studies (IWS) in New York City. Stuart Basefsky is responsible for the selection of the contents which is intended to keep researchers, companies, workers, and governments aware of the latest information related to ILR disciplines as it becomes available for the purposes of research, understanding and debate. The content does not reflect the opinions or positions of Cornell University, the School of Industrial & Labor Relations, or that of Mr. Basefsky and should not be construed as such. The service is unique in that it provides the original source documentation, via links, behind the news and research of the day. Use of the information provided is unrestricted. However, it is requested that users acknowledge that the information was found via the IWS Documented News Service.